Towards moral and authentic generalization : humanity, individual human beings and distortion by Rapport, Nigel Julian
 Rapport, Nigel: ‘Towards Moral and Authentic Generalization’, Culture Unbound, Volume 4, 




By Nigel Rapport 
Abstract 
The article treats the issue of generality. How may one conceive of the relation-
ship between the uniqueness of individuality and the commonality of the human 
(species and society) without reduction? Can generalization be made moral – es-
chewing stereotypes in society – and can it be made authentic – enacting a human 
science which treats the individual as a thing-in-itself? Simmel’s seminal inter-
vention was to see generality as a necessary kind of distortion. In contrast, this 
article offers rational models of the one and the whole which expect to retain the 
uniqueness of the one; and it suggests characteristics of human embodiment (ca-
pacities, potentialities) that speak to individuality and generality at the same time. 
The article ends with a reconsideration of distortion as a humane artistic represen-
tation, by way of the work of Stanley Spencer. 
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Introduction 
In this article I want to approach the old problem of generalisation but in the new 
context of cosmopolitanism, which I would define here as an attempt to appre-
hend the relationship between the human species and the individual human being 
as a scientific and a moral reality.1 The nature of the human condition – its ontol-
ogy – is that the universality of humanity represents itself always and only in the 
specificity of individual embodiment. This relationship is real and fundamental, 
different in nature to all other relations of a symbolic or discursive or rhetorical 
kind which human beings have constructed and to which they might be party: 
society, culture, community, nation. These symbolic relations, as constructs of 
language and classification, should not obfuscate the ‘cosmopolitan’ insight that 
all of humanity is one (a cosmos) and that human life manifests itself always and 
only in individual instantiations (in polis). Hence the starting point of my enquiry: 
there is a uniqueness to each of us, to every human being; our individuality is ir-
reducible. How then do we assemble human beings together? How do we general-
ise upon the human, both for the purposes of social science and for the purposes 
of social policy? Generalisation is both an issue of scientific method and of liberal 
democracy (Amit & Rapport 2012). 
Here is the ethnographer Vincent Crapanzano (2004: 6) expressing something 
of my quandary: 
I find that the singular has often been sacrificed to the general in the human sciences 
and that, more often than not, this has resulted in a distorting simplification of the 
human condition; in a failure fully to appreciate its ambiguous nature and the am-
bivalence it generates; in an implicit, if not explicit, emphasis on determinism; in an 
indifference to human creativity, transgressive possibility and imaginative play; and 
in a failure to address the question of human freedom. 
But such a realization is not recent and takes us back at least to the seminal essays 
of Georg Simmel from 1908, ‘How is Society Possible?’ and ‘The Problem of 
Sociology’. Here Simmel wrestled with the issue of generality and how it might 
be seen to relate to individuality. Generalization was, he felt, a necessary idiom, 
in whose terms human society might function justly and human science might 
function rightly. Hence, my concerns in this article are two-fold: I want to re-
examine the issue of applying generalization both in the field of a rational human 
science and in the field of just, liberal statecraft. And the two concerns are really 
treatments of the same question: is it possible to conceive of the relationship be-
tween the uniqueness of individuality and the generality of the human (species 
and society) without reduction or corruption? Generalization might be necessary 
but can it also be made moral – eschewing stereotypes in society – and can it be 
made authentic – enacting a human science which treats the individual as a thing-
in-itself? My course in the article is from the more theoretic to the more empiric, 
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for generalization is, finally, a very personal issue: how might I know another 
human being and be known? 
Simmel’s Distortions 
Let me begin by rehearsing some of the points of Simmel’s exposition and his 
conclusions. ‘Society exists where a number of individuals enter into interaction’, 
he begins (1971: 23), and its unity rests in the interaction of these individual ele-
ments. This means, moreover, that societies are structures inexorably composed of 
unequal elements, since the individual members are differentiated according to 
their natures, their life-contents and their destinies. A society may amount to a 
cosmos but it is nevertheless ‘a web of qualitatively differentiated phenomena’ 
(Simmel 1971: 19).  
A liberal society will endeavour to engender a democratic equality, Simmel 
continues, by dealing with a reasoned equivalence, between people or functions or 
positions. However, any society must yet function on the basis of certain distor-
tions which it decides upon and which operate as ‘a priori, operative categories’ 
(Simmel 1971: 12). It is only by means of these distorting categories that it is pos-
sible to move from individuals to members. For individuality is, by definition, 
incomprehensible: one can neither understand that of another nor incorporate it by 
extraneous measures. ‘Perfect cognition presupposes perfect identity’ (Simmel 
1971: 9), and we can neither know nor represent an individuality that is not our 
own. For the construct that is society, therefore, certain distortions must be 
brought to bear upon individual reality: ‘we see the other person generalized, in 
some measure’ (Simmel 1971: 9). 
Three main kinds of distortion can be identified, Simmel elaborates. They 
might be termed the ‘human’, the ‘personal’, and the ‘social’. In the first, we con-
ceive of each human being as being a representative of a certain human type such 
as is suggested (to us) by his or her individuality: the individual becomes for us ‘a 
general human being’. In the second, we conceive of each human being as being 
an ideal or full or perfect representative of himself or herself: we idealize or exag-
gerate his or her personality (such as we perceive it) so as to make him or her into 
‘a general version of himself or herself’. In the third, we conceive of each human 
being as representing his or her social placement or membership or role: the indi-
vidual becomes ‘a general group functionary’. Society is possible, Simmel con-
cludes, by virtue of generalizations which operate as so many a priori veils which 
at once detract from individuality and substitute for it.  
The problem of sociology, indeed of all science of the human, is that whereas 
the explanation of human facts most frequently entails ‘an exercise of psychologi-
cal knowledge’, it is the case that ‘the scientific treatment of psychic data is not 
thereby automatically psychological’ (Simmel 1971: 32). The science of society is 
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a study of certain structures, symbols and categories that derive from psychic cre-
ativity and are imbued with psychological meaning and yet which attain an objec-
tive reality which will possess its own formal properties: patterning, compatibili-
ties, development. One can say that the forms of social life operate as kinds of veil 
behind which the psychic contents live. It is impossible to accede to generality in 
any other way, whether as members of society or scientists of society. There may 
be ‘always one reality’ and only one reality, but we cannot grasp it in its immedi-
acy and wholeness; we can consider it only from particular viewpoints and at-
tempt to make it into ‘a plurality of mutually independent scientific subject mat-
ters’ (Simmel 1971: 33). 
It was the human tragedy, Simmel concluded, that individual things-in-the-
world could not be known in themselves but only in terms of extraneous forms. 
Hope lay in a kind of dialectical method by which one zigzagged between forms 
and contents – between one kind of representation and another – and thereby 
came to an understanding of how one influenced the other into gaining a mutual 
state of co-presence. But even here one dealt with representation: a zigzag be-
tween one kind of distortion and another. 
It becomes clear the extent to which Simmel’s sociology subscribed to Kantian 
notions of phenomena as against numina: the extent to which the world becomes 
an object of contemplation and intention only by way of categories of human per-
ception. Simmel did not agree with Kant that these categories were ‘transcendent’, 
or independent of historico-social process. For Simmel, categories achieved ob-
jectivity as a result of the ongoing process of social interaction: they emerged 
from the flux of life and derived from experience, in such a way that they stood 
formally over and against the noumenal as kinds of practical bulwark. Neverthe-
less, they were categories: the transition from individual to human society and 
from individual to human species was effected by a process of generalization 
which transformed the unknowable thing-in-itself into idealized and ideal-typical 
forms. The forms acted as kinds of necessary approximation and equivalency, 
with their own histories and relations, by which one hoped the ‘tragedy’ of the 
veils surrounding truth might be ameliorated by distortions which were ‘reasona-
ble’. 
Beyond Simmel 
Simmel was not entirely happy with his conclusions, and I am not either. This 
becomes clear in other observations of his, in Schopenhauer and Nietzsche 
(1991). Let me elaborate briefly. 
It was Kant’s formulation that everything observed and known – observable 
and knowable – is a phenomenon: something delineated by human powers of cog-
nition, by its being incorporated into a human symbolic scheme. Human cognition 
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transforms things-in-themselves into symbols with homes in conceptual frame-
works; beyond this, reality is left as it is. Human existence thus gives rise to a 
certain plurality: things do not remain only things. As well as being parts of a nat-
ural order beyond knowledge and definition, things come to be rendered as part of 
any number of symbolic orders. The things of the world become symbolic forms 
for us human beings, as well as maintaining their status as real objects beyond any 
forms and any relations to us, untouched in and for themselves. 
But this also smacks of relativism – idealism, certainly – and Simmel wished 
for a means to re-ground form in the real and to make human a prioris more au-
thentic to being. The solutions he preferred came from Nietzsche and from Scho-
penhauer. For Nietzsche, according to Simmel (1991: 142-8), there are fundamen-
tal aspects of the human condition which are independent of social formation even 
though they might of necessity be expressed in social forms. The individual, for 
instance, is a final element of being – there is nothing greater, socially, than his or 
her organicism – and it is this individuality which human action inevitably ex-
presses. Personality, for Nietzsche, becomes the ultimate value of existence: a full 
and mature individual personality possesses a value that is absolute and trans-
cendent. This is because humanity, which also exists as a fundamental aspect of 
reality independent of social formation, exhibits itself in individuals. "Humanity 
follows a single line to oneself", as Nietzsche advises (1979: 86). Even if individ-
uals only appear in society, and even if there is an impossible dichotomy such that 
social forms are never able to subsume the individual, still there is a sense in 
which there is a continuous, real, evolutionary line between the human species 
and the particular form of life which the individual human being embodies. Indi-
viduality and humanity have a conjoined reality against which that of social 
forms, norms, concepts and categories are recognisable as contingencies. There 
are real human values and interests and real individual natures. It is real individual 
nature to be unequal, for instance, Nietzsche asserts. Differences and distances 
between individuals are natural facts, and these differences are the hope of evolu-
tion: humanity proceeds forward not as an assemblage but through its particular, 
successful individual expressions. Humanity cannot be defined apart from indi-
viduals, while the latter possess ultimate value because of their embodiment of 
states or moments of the former. Even though there can be no social comprehen-
sion of individual being and its worth, still individuals, as things-in-themselves, 
possess a recognisable objectivity and meaning. Each individual embodies the 
evolutionary culmination of the human species. Their meaning is their uniqueness, 
their difference and distance from everything else: here is enshrined the future of 
the species as a whole. 
Morally, Simmel was fearful of identifying with Nietzsche too completely. 
How might one ward off extreme self-centeredness and selfishness, and solip-
sism? He was happy to turn to Schopenhauer, therefore, to complement the Nie-
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tzschean picture with an emphasis on social obligation and identification. The 
objectivity of social forms was a means to inculcate a sentiment of belonging and 
an ethic of duty. One could be at once individual and recognize a duty to a hu-
manity which manifested itself in a current social whole, an ambient society. 
Through social forms, the individual could find meaning beyond himself or her-
self; there could be social unity and mobilization towards common ends in a dis-




Rather than Simmel’s conclusions as such – my sympathies would remain with 
the Nietzschean argument (Rapport 1997, 2003) – I am interested in the way in 
which his search for a rational basis to the issue of generality, both in human soci-
ety and in human science, led him from a relativist or idealist position which con-
cluded that the general was inevitably a distortion (with its roots in necessity and 
in effecting certain practical consequences) to a more realist position which would 
seek to ground the relation between individual human beings in empirical reality 
and not merely in their sociocultural phenomenalism. This is a key distinction: 
seeking to posit generality as real and not merely as a construct – not simply a 
means to label and stereotype, define and process, an otherwise unknowable indi-
viduality. The generality of being part of a social class or cultural category – 
‘woman’, ‘Muslim’, ‘Welsh’, ‘baby-boomer’, ‘hysteric’, ‘cleric’ – bears no neces-
sary relation to the true between-ness that might exist among individual human 
beings as members of a universal species. I would wish the contingencies of the 
sociocultural to be overcome and for generality to be both a route to genuine 
knowledge of the way in which the individual instantiates the human, and a route 
to genuine democracy in which the individual and the liberal state share a relation 
of mutual identification: the individual sees himself or herself in the state, the 
state sees itself as an aggregation of individuals. The individual is unique and yet 
scientifically accommodated as an exemplar of the species: the individual is 
unique and yet the subject of statal policies of universal recognition and attention.  
In what follows I endeavour to proceed along both the above routes: to the 
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1. Generality and the Route to Human Science 
The issue of generality in human science is, to repeat, how to know the unique 
human being – Anyone – in a general way without thereby traducing or reducing 
that individuality. How is the human to be seen manifesting itself in the individual 
in a fashion that does not detract from seeing the latter as at the same time sui 
generis? 
Two ways to resolve the issue may be, first, in terms of specific models of the 
one and the whole which retains the uniqueness of the one, and second, in terms 
of characteristics of human embodiment that may speak to individuality and gen-
erality at the same time. 
1(a) Modelling the One and the Whole 
I am wary of certain arithmetic procedures for averaging-out difference, such as 
the ‘mean’, the ‘median’ and the ‘mode’, since they would have one figure stand 
for all: a common denominator. The average figure would seem to possess a met-
onymic relation to the original, different instantiations: one averages or generaliz-
es in such a way that one figure replaces and gives on to the many. But I do not 
believe that individual human beings can be averaged in this way: their relation-
ship towards one another is more metaphoric than metonymic. The move from 
individual to human should not be conceived of in terms of replacement or inte-
gration, I would say, but in terms of aggregation or juxtaposition. Each individual 
is a complete and irreducible instantiation of the human, and their rational identi-
fication as human must be achieved with their differences being treated as intrin-
sic to their identity. 
Three viable models suggest themselves to me, based on what I call the flower, 
the family, and the spectrum. 
The flower is a way of naming Nietzsche’s idea that the individual human be-
ing is the culmination, the florescence, of the evolution of humanity. The line of 
the species ends, at present, with the individual who is as responsible as any other 
for how it continues into the future. As the florescence of the human species the 
individual carries within himself or herself the entire human phylogeny and yet 
amounts to a unique expression, embodying the random mutation of one procrea-
tion. The individual heritage and parentage is clear, his or her placement in an 
evolutionary history is generally assured, and yet his or her nature is unique and 
non-predictable, and that of his or her progeny equally so. As a flower or flower-
ing, the individual human being is both generalizable and unique. Nietzsche’s 
writings themselves serve as an analogy: they possess a German linguistic form 
and are imbued with stylistic expressions of literary heritage, and yet they repre-
sent a flowering of his unique individual creativity. No one else wrote Nietzsche’s 
oeuvre; until he had done so its progeny was impossible; even after he had done 
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so, its progeny remained unforeseeable. The flower combines a common heritage 
with unique current expression. 
The family is a borrowing of Wittgenstein’s conception of the polythetic cate-
gory. At its simplest this can be given the shape: (ABC, CDE, EFG, GHI... ). In 
slightly more complex form: (ABC, BZG, YHF, JKL, AGL... ). In more complex 
form again: (Abc, A11, 1c@, b@3, 3£@... ). Key to the polythetic category is the 
notion that members of the category need share no feature in common. Rather 
there is a set of features, a bundle of traits, shared randomly among them. There is 
no necessary limit or closure to these traits (no alphabet) and their particular pos-
session and also their ordering is unique to each member, making each individual. 
It is, in Wittgenstein’s (1978) parlance, as if each individual shared a ‘family re-
semblance’ to others in the category, the family nose here and here, the family 
eyes here and here, but no one family trait was shared by all, and in combination, 
too, the assemblage amounted to a unique embodiment. The individual is both 
generalizable as a family member and uniquely himself or herself. The family 
combines a common set of characteristics with unique combination of these. 
The spectrum or sliding scale images a range of possibilities within which in-
dividual members find themselves while each occupies a unique position on the 
scale. Human beings may, then, need a certain daily calorific intake to survive: 
too little or too much proves fatal. Certain substances, moreover, may be absolute-
ly excluded from supplying this total – those that are too stony, say, or too prickly 
or otherwise toxic to the human constitution. Within this range, however, individ-
uals may be unique regarding their optimum calorific intake and their favourite 
dietary items and meals. Anyone is recognisably human in terms of the spectrum 
between whose poles life is sustainable and yet irreducibly themselves in the ex-
pression which human life achieves in them. The spectrum combines a common 
range of possibilities with unique actual location. 
Each of these – flower, family, spectrum – allows me to model a universal rela-
tionship between individual and totality. I can rationally apply them to real situa-
tions while still being assured that the generalities they deliver do not negate my 
also affording testimony to the uniqueness of the individual case. 
The models work together, as should become clear when I consider one ex-
pression of the human in more detail: the body. 
1(b) Bodily Characteristics as Individual and General 
There is a universality to human embodiment. One can say that the capacities of 
the individual body, its capabilities and liabilities –in a word, its nature – exhibit a 
generality. 
One can assert, for instance, that all individual human bodies possess a distinct 
materiality as living organisms. All have boundaries and componential clusters of 
cells. The constituents of one body cannot be at the same time those of another 
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(though they might be over time). Yet, this characteristic of organic differentiation 
is at the same time shared. There is a human generality to our individual materiali-
ty: the relationship is a family one, and also a flowering, the culmination of one 
material history. Then again, all individual human bodies, as material things, pos-
sess a distinct spatiality. The space that is occupied by one cannot at the same 
time be occupied by another. And this property is common, reciprocal: we are 
alike as human beings in needing to occupy a space, at any one time, that is 
uniquely our own. Yet, while the dimensions of own personal bodily space will be 
unique to each of us, there is a human generality to be found in the fact that the 
living individual organism requires an irreducible space of its own. Here is also a 
family relationship, and a spectral one, the spatiality of each of us having ele-
ments – cells, noses, sexual organs – whose arrangement is unique within a hu-
man range. 
Related to this is the fact that all individual human bodies, as independent or-
ganisms, possess a distinct temporality. The time and the timing of no two lives is 
identical – the developmental processes, the longevity – and each must occupy its 
own temporal dimension and no other. But again this is something that we share: 
the uniqueness of an individual time of life is general among all human beings. 
There is no stopping, no reversing, no repeating, no doubling for anyone. The 
relationship is a flowering, and individual’s temporality being derived from a spe-
cies history, and also spectral, within a human range. The materiality, spatiality 
and temporality of the individual human life are accompanied by an environmen-
tal range, a spectral relationship as such, which characterizes their possible bodily 
workings. There are environmental conditions suited evolutionarily to the possible 
life-chances of the species. Within this range, however, it is not possible to gener-
alize upon optimal positionings. The unique materiality of each body, its unique 
experience of attending to environmental conditions, means that the individual 
finds his or her own habituality and equilibrium. The range of possibilities con-
cerning bodily functioning in environments bespeaks both a general delimitation 
and a wide individual variability. 
Lastly, there are capacities of the human body that identify it as a general phe-
nomenon. These operate as universal potentialities, albeit that in their usage or 
deployment or expression, in the substantiation of general human capacities, the 
universal is transformed into the individual. There is, for instance, a general ca-
pacity to imagine a human life: it is an individual substantiation of this capacity to 
write the plays of Shakespeare, the philosophy of Nietzsche. There is the general 
human capacity to feel pain and find something laughable; also, the general hu-
man capacity to sense, perceive, conceive, ideate, imagine, interpret, define, in-
tend, wish, hope, know, recall. The human being can express himself or herself, 
and interpret the expressions of others. The human being can be self conscious, 
reflexive, introspective, ironic; he or she can effect changes on his or her own 
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body and the world that lies beyond the borders of that body. The human being 
creates world-views, provides personal contexts to his or her life, and he or she 
can construe a life-project: the trajectory that his or her life should or might or 
will take within that world and among the others that it contains. None of this talk 
of capacity, however, reduces the individuality of substance that a life does actual-
ly contain. A range of factors, furthermore, may supervene upon these capacities 
and affect their realization: from individual intentionality to circumstantial (social, 
cultural, historical) circumscription, to accidental or random intervention –the 
genetic mutation, the car crash, the famine that subverts the capacity to reproduce. 
Notwithstanding, the human might be known by the general capacities which it 
encompasses; while the individual is known by the unique fashion in which those 
capacities come to imbue a life. The relationship between capacity and substance 
is a flowering, from phylogeny to ontogeny, and also familial, the substance of no 
two lives being the same however much history, society and culture may colour 





Symbolic modelling (1(a)) and bodily characterization (1(b)) would appear to be 
two routes along which one can significantly advance towards establishing gen-
eral truths about the human condition – authentic knowledge and moral insights – 
while at the same time not detracting from or threatening the integrity of the indi-
viduality in whose terms the human everywhere expresses itself in and as life. Let 
me turn to the social practice upon which these general truths might prove conse-
quential. 
2. Generality and the Route to Liberal Society 
In formulating a ‘cosmopolitan’ version of justice, a civil treatment of all human 
beings in all times and places, Kant (1785/1993: 36) isolated what he termed ‘The 
Formula of Humanity as an End in Itself’: 'Act in such a way that you always treat 
humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply 
as a means to an end, but always as an end in itself'. This is an ideal, but I would 
approach it by conceptualizing a liberal society as that set of legal, institutional and 
procedural norms which recognize individual members as things-in-themselves – 
the ends of whose existence is for themselves to define – and not as means by 
which other, typical ends are made manifest. The ‘problem’ of society, as Simmel 
elaborated, is recognition. Is it possible to treat the individual members of a socie-
ty – for a state to know its members and for its members to know one another – 
except by way of the kind of distortion that he outlined? Can the generality neces-
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sary for social structuration accommodate individuality except by way of stereo-
typification and labelling: turning individuals into types of human being, types of 
person, types of role-player?  
The problem is also one of regulation. Society may be conceived of, indeed, as 
a state of regulation or intervention. The liberal society is a state that endeavours 
to ensure the lives of individual members are treated as ends not means: it inter-
venes in a rationalized fashion so as to maintain a Kantian ‘kingdom of ends’. But 
how may individuality be legislated for?  
A solution derives, perhaps, from an identification of capacities, or potentiali-
ties, as distinct from any substance. The liberal society – liberal laws and institu-
tions – recognizes individuals on the basis of universal capacities of human con-
sciousness. The offices of the liberal state intervene in efforts to guarantee that 
individuals’ capacities for creating the substance of their lives, for determining 
their own ends, is afforded as much space for expression as possible. Iris Murdoch 
(2001) has suggested a definition for 'goodness' as abstaining from visiting one's 
desires upon others: the ‘good society’ is defined less in terms of ‘doing good to 
others’ than in ‘refraining from doing others harm’. Goodness resides in a kind of 
space in which individuals can ‘come into their own’; one cannot foresee and does 
not attempt to prescribe what this latter might entail in terms of the substance of a 
life, but one hopes to afford each an optimum of space for its expression, and to 
maintain that expression as a right. The problem of society – to institute arrange-
ments which balance a kind of spatial individuality with a regulative generality – 
is settled by way of a guaranteeing of individuals’ capacities to come into their 
own. 
Let me reprise, however, the particular issue with which this article is most 
concerned. How are the offices of the liberal state to know its members and to 
intervene in individual lives in such a way as to recognize and to assist (and not 
obstruct) the fulfilment of their individuality? How does one treat that aspect of a 
unique temporality that is the individual only gradually approaching the mature 
human capacity to create self and world? How does one envisage ‘the space to 
come into one’s own’ when the unique materiality that is an individual life is born 
of others (that of parents) and remains surrounded by others (family, friends, 
community) which would wish from it a special allegiance and sympathy? How 
does one know others’ rationally, in terms of universal aspects of their individual 
human embodiment, when they might insist on knowing themselves (and others) 
in terms of non-rational ideologies and particularistic essentialisms that would 
subvert any universalistic conception of Anyone?  
The key term is, I believe, potentiality. A liberal society is one where it is rec-
ognized that the individual embodies the human capacity to interpret truth, to de-
termine identity, and always to become anew. The state is here, most importantly, 
the guarantor of the individual right to exercise the capacity to reflect and to be-
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come: to become other than it is at present; to become other than any existing ex-
pression of the human condition; to become other than even it itself knew it 
might. Again, one does not deal in substances but in capacities: the offices of the 
state are not interested in what is created and chosen only that it is chosen and 
might be unchosen, recreated. If the child is that immature human being for whom 
choices are inevitably made by others, then state institutions are the guarantor of 
the immature individual’s right to unchoose, to exit from parental choices and 
ideologies, at the point of maturity. The role of state institutionalism is further to 
ensure that no parental influence makes an unchoosing later impossible: the ideal 
is to conceptualize every moment as a possibly radical becoming, and every 
choice as free from extraneous conditioning. Given the unique temporality of an 
individual life, the ontogenetic consequence of each of us inhabiting only one, 
continuous biography, such free choice opening up at every moment of our lives 
will remain an ideal. But the criterion of state intervention can be nevertheless 
based on this: is this a circumstance in this individual’s life whereby an unchoos-
ing, a future exit strategy and a wholly new rechoosing, becomes less than likely 
given the necessary range of conditions within which human consciousness might 
flourish? 
A liberal society, however rational its arrangements, will never represent an 
exact science. Can liberal laws, institutions and procedures encompass individual 
lives such that they remain ends in themselves: regulate and administer to lives 
such that any interventions treat their individuality rather than a kind of typicality? 
I say ‘yes’, where the state knows the individual as a potentiality and legislates on 
behalf of its members on the basis of such potentiality. The deliverances of sci-
ence concerning human-individual capabilities and liabilities – the materiality, 
temporality, spatiality and range of individual human lives – are translated into 
rational policy. The individual is approached not as he or she is in terms of partic-
ular present or past substance – or the substance of any relational affiliation (fami-
ly, community, ethnicity, church) – but as that being possessing the capacity al-
ways to be beyond current identifications (Rapport 2010). The procedures of the 
liberal state attempt to do justice to that capacity to go beyond by affording the 
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Conclusion: Distortion Revisited 
When your life is most real, to me you are mad (Olive Schreiner 1998: 69) 
I have been concerned in this article with ways that might give a rational founda-
tion to the generality of human individuality which is non-reductive, both for the 
purposes of a human science and of a liberal society. I am keen, too, to explore 
the different ways in which one can do justice to the paradoxical relation between 
the individual and the human. How to generalise across the dialectic between in-
dividual and human such that the accommodation of difference by sameness in-
volves an authentic assessment? In our individuality we are at the same time most 
distant from one another (most ‘mad’, as Olive Schreiner put it) and most the 
same.  
I end by reconsidering distortion, the theme with which I began. But rather 
than the distortions which Simmel felt were pragmatically and morally necessary 
in order for society and sociology to function, I approach distortion as evidence of 
the attempt to represent the individuality of another. Distortion arises from being 
true to the gratuitousness, the radical otherness (the ‘madness’ (Schreiner)) of 
another human psyche as it seems from the perspective of one’s own (Rapport 
2008). One cannot know that other as it is in itself and for itself. However, I 
would argue that it remains the duty of a human science and a human morality – 
as of a human art – to make the attempt, for then one seeks to do justice to this 
perfect (and unique) instantiation of the human, and one attests that only through 
the individual can one hope the better to know the species, its capabilities and 
liabilities, and better to provide for its fulfilment. More proximately, one recog-
nises that any collectivity, any society, social grouping or community, is com-
prised of conscious individuals: ‘constituted by self consciousness’, as Anthony 
Cohen (1994: 146) phrases it, ‘substantiated by the meanings which conscious 
selves impute to received [social-symbolic] forms’. ‘If we do not do descriptive 
justice to individuals’, Cohen concludes (1992: 229), ‘it is hard to see how we 
could do it for societies’. Approaching the generality of the human through the 
particularity of the individual, and accepting the distortion as inevitable evidence 
of the paradox of that relationship, becomes both best scientific and moral prac-
tice.  
My approach to distortion is motivated by the work of the great twentieth-
century British artist, Stanley Spencer, in particular a set of paintings which he 
named ‘The Beatitudes of Love’ (1937-8). Spencer professed that these eight 
paintings were the ones he was the most loath to part with: ‘I can do without all 
my paintings except these’ (cited in Collis 1962: 142). The series was ‘more genu-
ine’ than anything else he had completed. Here is ‘Contemplation’ (1938). 
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What Spencer felt he had achieved in ‘The Beatitudes of Love’ was to gain a true 
appreciation of the individual at the same time as the composition displayed a 
human unity and singularity. ‘I have never seen any paintings that more truly re-
veal the individual’, he wrote shortly after their completion, while yet ‘each of the 
pictures shows the twined and unified soul of two persons’ (cited in Collis 1962: 
141-2). Spencer often wrote long commentaries in accompaniment of his paint-
ings, words and paint complementing his work of self-expression. Of ‘Contempla-
tion’, he writes that: ‘it is of people making themselves endlessly acquainted with 
each other through passion and desire’ (cited in Pople 1991: 387); ‘the figures are 
engaged in contemplation of each other, as is expressed by their rapt gaze, as 
though they would never stop looking’ (cited in Collis 1962: 141). 
I cannot draw more deeply here on the philosophy behind Spencer’s statements 
(cf. Rapport 2003: 179-211), but I would address the issue of his painterly style. 
The series was not well received by Spencer’s British audience. Why the arresting 
and grotesque figuration, the apparent ugliness and deformity, and all but denuded 
of background? Even friends and erstwhile admirers found them ‘terrible’ to con-
template and refused to find that people were really like that (Bell 2001: 147). 
Spencer himself admitted to some ‘consternation’ when he first realized, on their 
completion, how he had departed from people’s ‘normal appearances’ and dimen-
sions; for it was not a deliberate affectation or the outcome of a preconceived 
plan. He stuck with the distortion, however, and defended it. Distortion could be 
seen to be intrinsic to the composition, the conveyance of the picture’s meaning, 
he elaborated (Spencer 2001: 186-8). The distortion manifested the strength of 
emotion and desire, the imaginative integrity and ‘spiritual intensity’, the purity 
and clarity of vision, as he attempted artistically to express two things: his intui-
tive knowledge of another human being, and his knowledge of the relation that 
these others had to one another. Put in his own verbal idiom, his ‘metaphysic of 
love’, Spencer (2001: 165) explained that: ‘distortion arises from the effort to see 
something in a way that will enable [me] to love it’: it is the ‘loving’ artist who is 
able to begin lifting ‘the barrier’ to mutual comprehension whereby individuals 
might ‘reveal themselves meaningfully’ to one another. Imagine how individual 
passers-by in the street would appear, Spencer later recommended to a radio-
interviewer, if they were stripped of their fashionable accoutrements, the stays of 
their status and position. His art revealed them in their reality, his representation 
animated by an inner awareness of identity and relationality.  
In the terms of this article, here is the distortion that derives from wishing to 
see others for what they are. What the artist sees is a distortion of what he or she 
takes to be normal, ordinary, conventional, because what is being espied is the 
irreducible specificity of others’ individual identity. But the artist, as self con-
scious human being, is capable, indeed duty bound, to make the attempt. Distor-
tion thereby expresses the ‘drama’ of a human composition: sameness and differ-
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ence in paradoxical relation. In effecting this drama, the artist gives the world an 
insight into the ‘reality’ of human unity: certainly Spencer found the composition 
of individuality and totality which his paintings revealed to him ‘remarkable’ (cit-
ed in Collis 1962: 141). 
Spencer was unable to reconcile the public to these paintings: he even hid some 
of them from view for fear of prosecution on grounds of pornography. He felt 
lonely but he did not recant: the compositions were new and unique and were re-
vealing of a ‘hoard of significant meanings to life’ (Spencer, cited in Collis 1962: 
142). Existing laws and conventions may seriously threaten but the ‘ghastly vul-
garity’ of such could not touch ‘the fullest extent of inspirational powers at the 
time of the conception of the idea’, nor the insights such ‘inwardness’ afforded 
concerning human mutuality (Spencer, cited in Bell 2001: 153). Spencer’s only 
regret, he attested (2001: 230), was that the limitations of human anatomy meant 
he could not ‘swallow’ the world whole: some ‘misshaping’ had to occur when an 
individual brought the world within his or her personal representational schema, 
but the attempt was necessary and worthwhile in itself. The ‘failure’ of distortion 
was itself testament to the impossibility of occupying a position other than an in-
dividual’s own and the effort represented that truth.4  
This work of Stanley Spencer may also appear an odd place for the article to 
conclude. My stance is rationalist: it is reason, as opposed to divine revelation or 
reliance on traditional authority, that can and should play a dominant role in ena-
bling us, first, to gain knowledge of ourselves and our world and, second, to im-
plement social arrangements for human betterment and freedom. But I also want 
to suppose that the general truths to which reason introduces us, universal and 
objective, can and should accommodate the objectivity of subjectivity: one would 
do justice to the absolute irreducibility of individual self-consciousness and identi-
ty. One recognizes the mix of modalities that comprise consciousness: emotion 
and passion, practicality and aesthetics, the narrations of hope and remembrance, 
alongside reason. Yet the existential truth of our individuality, our complexity, our 
imperfect situationality (our partiality), need not detract from our commitment to 
that Enlightenment project of overcoming both nescience and injustice. 
While the mysterious artistry of distorted representations may seem a distance 
from the will to account rationally for the individual among the totality of his or 
her human fellows, then, I recall Popper’s encouragement that no source of 
knowledge should be ruled out of the scientific canon at face value, and I recall 
the problematic with which Simmel launched his scientific study of society: how 
is it possible to know the individual other except as a type? In my estimation this 
corresponds to Stanley Spencer’s project, wishing to portray the human individu-
al, uniquely and in juxtaposition, as an authentic irreduction. His kind of distor-
tion is preferable to Simmel’s, however, because it is a general composition de-
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rived not from stereotypification but from a commitment to recognizing and to 
treating radical individual otherness as a thing-in-itself.  
One reaches the moral conclusion that seeking to represent the substance of 
another individual human other results in a worthy distortion; and one reaches the 
rational conclusion that seeking to accommodate rationally the capacities of the 
individual human other is a route to human science and free society. 
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Notes 
1  A fuller treatment of my theme appears in: Anyone, the Cosmopolitan Subject of Anthropolo-
gy, by Nigel Rapport, Berghahn Books, Oxford, 2012. 
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